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Abstract
This paper indicates how continental philosophy may contribute to a diagnostics of
contemporary life sciences research, as part of a “diagnostics of the present”
(envisioned by continental thinkers, from Hegel up to Foucault). First, I describe (as a
“practicing” philosopher) various options for an oblique (or symptomatic) reading of
emerging scientific discourse, bent on uncovering the basic “philosophemes” of
science (i.e. the guiding ideas, the basic conceptions of nature, life and technology at
work in contemporary life sciences research practices). Subsequently, I outline a
number of radical transformations occurring both at the object-pole and at the
subject-pole of the current knowledge relationship, namely the technification of the
object and the anonymisation or collectivisation of the subject, under the sway of
automation, ICT and big machines. Finally, I further elaborate the specificity of the
oblique perspective with the help of Lacan’s theorem of the four discourses.
Philosophical reflections on contemporary life sciences concur neither with a Master’s
discourse (which aims to strengthen the legitimacy and credibility of canonical sources)
, nor with university discourse (which aims to establish professional expertise), nor with
what Lacan refers to as hysterical discourse (which aims to challenge representatives of
the power establishment), but rather with the discourse of the analyst, listening with
evenly-poised attention to the scientific files in order to bring to the fore the cupido
sciendi (i.e. the will to know, but also to optimise and to control) which both inspires
and disrupts contemporary life sciences discourse.
“More detail is needed about the research’s methodology. It is not sufficiently clear
how the main objectives of the research can be reached” (anonymous reviewer of a
grant proposal)
Introduction
For continental philosophers working in interdisciplinary environments and committed
to assessing the philosophical and societal dimensions of contemporary technoscience,
the methodology section of grant proposals may pose a challenge. How to explain (to
reviewers from the natural science, the social sciences or more mainstream areas of
philosophical inquiry such as author studies or biomedical ethics) what continental
philosophers studying technoscience actually do? Although standard phrases
(“discourse analysis”, “desk research”, etc.) are available for such occasions, compared
to the methodologies of the social sciences, or even bioethics, the tools and methods
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for this type of work seem much less clearly defined. To what extent and in what way
may continental philosophical inquiry be considered “applicable” or even “replicable”,
for instance?
Although the signifier “continental philosophy” began its career as a pejorative term
and remains difficult to define, a family likeness is nonetheless discernible among ad-
epts (Critchley 2001; Glendinning 2006; Zwart, Landeweerd and Lemmens 2016), in-
cluding the conviction that outstanding techno-scientific developments (such as the
Human Brain Project or the synthetic cell) may be regarded as symptoms or exemplifi-
cations of the zeitgeist, providing relevant input for a diagnostics of the present, as
Hegel1 phrases it and perhaps even pointing to a “metaphysical mutation” (Houellebecq
1998), a new “dawn of day” (Nietzsche 1881/1980). Yet, compared to other areas of
inquiry, continental philosophical reflections tend to stay relatively close to activities
human beings already engage in in every-day, non-academic settings, such as talking,
reading, listening and thinking. Taking notes, asking questions, paying attention, visit-
ing laboratories and discussing the drawbacks and benefits of emerging technologies
can hardly be considered an idiosyncrasy of academic philosophers, although they may
claim to do this in a comparatively consistent, critical and thoughtful manner. When it
comes to reading, for instance, continental philosophers have various reading strategies
at their disposal, ranging from “hermeneutics” (Gadamer 1960/1990) via “discourse
analysis” (Foucault 1969) up to “reading aloud” (Althusser & Balibar 1965/1970).
Through such techniques, philosophers may distance themselves from everyday dis-
course and mainstream views – from Gerede, as Heidegger (1927/1986) once
phrased it. Rather than acting as moderators or spokespersons of public opinion,
they may function as suspicious minds, committed to developing “untimely” ethical,
epistemological and ideological critique. The objective of this paper is to outline
the methodological repertoire of a continental philosophy of technoscience as a
diagnostic praxis.
The intentio obliqua
In the current era of ELSA and RRI research, philosophers often work as “embedded”
scholars in interdisciplinary settings, attending scientific lectures and meetings where
research findings are discussed, but listening to such deliberations with a “different
ear”. Rather than on the scientific content or technical details, they will focus on the
ways in which the findings are presented, the signifiers that are used, the contrivances
that are employed, the images that are projected, or the metaphors that are adopted. In
other words: the axis of attention takes a quarter turn. Such lectures are followed from
a slightly tilted, oblique perspective. Instead of on the object-pole (molecules, microbes,
model organisms, etc.), the focus is rather on the subject-pole: the researcher or re-
search team, the interaction between experimenters and their targets, “observing the
observer”, as Bachelard (1938/1949, p. 13) once phrased it. They follow such lectures
with evenly-posed attention (‘gleichschwebende Aufmerksamkeit’; Freud 1912/1943),
and from a critical angle: a position which is comparable to how psychoanalysts keep
track of the analysand’s discursive flow. At a certain point, somewhere in the stream of
discourse, a specific image or concept may light up, triggering attention, catching the
“philosophical ear”, so that a shift towards a more active, Socratic mode of listening is
indicated, prompting questions and dialogue.
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The intentio obliqua has a long history. Whereas science tends to focus on the object
(the intentio recta), philosophy reflects on how this object is allowed to emerge (Breil
2011). Nicolai Hartmann (Hartmann 1935) argued that, whereas the “natural” direction of
knowledge (the intentio recta, represented by natural science) is oriented towards the ob-
ject under study, the “reflected” direction (intentio obliqua, i.e. knowledge reflecting upon
itself ) is typical for philosophy. The distinction goes back to medieval scholasticism.
Thomas Aquinas already stated that, whereas human understanding is initially directed
towards external reality, critical reflection on human understanding requires a change of
perspective, an intentio obliqua (Schmidt 1966). By opting for an oblique perspective, a
diagnostics of contemporary knowledge can be achieved: a critical assessment of the way
contemporary life science allows living reality to emerge. This means that, rather than in
protons, mitochondria or microbes, philosophers are interested in the λόγος–dimension:
the words or signifiers that are actually used to bring such objects to the fore.
Bachelard once argued that, in terms of competence, philosophers have but one: “the
competence of reading” (Bachelard 1948, p. 6). Not only in the sense that they are ex-
perienced or even voracious readers, but also because their reading is slow and inter-
minable (Bachelard 1938/1949, p. 18), while the focus of attention is on the subject-
pole rather than the object-pole of the knowledge relationship (on the microbiologist
rather than on the microbe). How is the object isolated, dissected, brought to the fore
and allowed to emerge? Research emerges as a dialectical process, and the focus is on
how the object is prompted to reveal itself: on the practical, computational and discur-
sive intricacies involved in conducting experiments. Thus, an oblique reading style en-
tails an active form of reading, “with the pen at the ready” (“la plume à la main”), as
Denis Diderot once phrased it. The axis of attention has taken a quarter turn.
Let me elucidate this with the help of some examples, taken from my own experience
as a “practicing” philosopher. Since the 1990s, scientific discourse has produced a
whole series of ‘-omics’ terms (‘genomics’, ‘proteomics’, ‘metabolomics’, ‘transcriptomics’
and so on). Such terms are closely connected with machinery, with big computers and
high-throughput sequencing contrivances. They are the textual by-products of high-
tech equipment, while their research targets are represented by a second series of signi-
fiers (a parallel series of neologisms), ending with the suffix ‘–ome’ (the ‘genome’, the
‘proteome’, the ‘metabolome’, the ‘transcriptome’, the ‘connectome’, the ‘environome’,
etc.). New labels containing an –ome or –omics component continue to show up, as
new signifiers (composed along these lines) make their appearance. This grammar of –
omes and –omics plays a performative role, rearranging rather than merely describing
the evolving fields in question. Intriguing recent examples of –omics neologisms
include the “unknome” (i.e. genes of unknown function, whose role scientists have not
(yet) been able to identify); the “environome” or “exposome” (i.e. that part of external
reality which can be sequenced by next-generation sequencing machines and deposited
in electronic data-bases: the environment insofar as it becomes readable as molecular
messages); and last but not least the “complexome” (i.e. the complex interactions
between some of the –omes listed above).
The latter –omics target is studied by an unfolding research field called “complexomics”,
a term which I encountered for the first time during a lecture on protons in mitochondrial
research, so that my evenly-poised attention gave way to a Socratic stance. What does
“complexomics” mean? Why was it coined? On the one hand, this signifier seems to
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underscore the bewildering complexity of life, allegedly beyond the grasp even of large-
scale research consortia, notwithstanding the high-tech equipment (such as next-
generation sequencing machines) and substantial funding arrangements available to them.
But at the same time the label conveys the opposite idea, namely that (in the terabyte age)
even the most complex interactions can be opened-up through digital analysis. In other
words: the term complexomics conveys an attitude of modesty compensated by hubris. It
is a “symptom”, a symptomatic phrase reflecting a basic ambivalence by both emphasising
and obfuscating the complexities of living systems.
My second example comes from microbiology, where gnotobiology became a key sig-
nifier in contemporary microbiome research.2 Gnotobiology studies germ-free research
animals, uncontaminated by micro-organisms (Gilbert & Neufeld 2014), although liter-
ally and originally the term refers to the study of animal models whose germs are fully
known; − gnoto- comes from the Greek word γνῶσις (=knowledge). Gnotobiotic ani-
mals can only exist under gnotobiotic conditions: they spend their lives in germ-free
bubbles inside laboratories, unable to survive in the open. In other words they are
laboratory artefacts or bio-objects, units for experimental study and products of the
“obsession” to eliminate microorganisms from human existence (Gilbert & Neufeld
2014, p. 1). The term reflects the technological prowess of scientists to construct and
maintain germ-free, bio-conditioned dwellings. And whereas on the manifest level the
focus is on reductionist control (stripping organisms of unnecessary ballast), a latent
“germophobia”, a desire for catharsis and purification seems involved as well. Gnoto-
biology results from biology’s desire to purify and cleanse life in order to fully control
it, by systematically reducing its messiness and increasing the transparency of living
systems. Remember that the artificial human (the homunculus) produced in the labora-
tory of Goethe’s Faust (the primal scene or Urszene of the modern life sciences) like-
wise spent his life in a bubble, a gnotobiotic crystal vial (Goethe 1808/1910, 6884). The
term γνῶσις has an alchemistic ring, moreover, as the creation of artificial life was ori-
ginally an alchemistic dream. But also in modern science, knowledge is ideally achieved
through purification and subtraction, which is the basic objective of this type of bio-
medical inquiry: living entities are stripped in a radical way of their messy surplus. One
could even claim that all laboratory-based biology is heading in this direction, driven
by the desire to become gnotobiology. To know microbes means to control them, while
the ultimate aim is human organismal self-knowledge (γνῶθι σεαυτόν).
Whether discursive phenomena such as ‘complexomics’ and ‘gnotobiology’ are indeed
symptomatic, telling and revealing (well chosen, in other words) must be validated by fur-
ther analysis, but the tension between complexity and reductionism, or between purifica-
tion and control, may claim an epistemological urgency which, I would argue, transcends
these (more or less impromptu) examples. Thus, philosophers may overcome the concern
already brought forward by Michel Serres (1972), namely that in the present era of disrup-
tive change, exemplified by the emergence of large-scale, high-tech, trans-disciplinary re-
search fields such as molecular biology, philosophy runs the risk of losing track, of
becoming outdated and irrelevant. Philosophers may still play a vital role, Serres argues,
provided they acquaint themselves with these newly emerging “oceans” of knowledge
opened up by techno-science, from a position of close proximity, entering the tissues and
capillaries of emerging research arenas as embedded scholars, addressing philosophical
issues raised by these developments in close interaction with the scientists involved.
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Philosophy becomes “conceptual epidemiology”: analysing and assessing how techniques,
vocabularies, concepts, metaphors and research practices spread through research fields
worldwide, infecting and inflaming the tissues of the broader societal life-world as well.
The oblique perspective sees research terminology as a by-product of technology and
explicitly pays attention to how the technological ambiance conditions the emerging
discursive world.
From discursive symptom to philosopheme
Complexomics and gnotobiology are symptoms of a more basic discursive ambivalence,
as we have argued. Although scientific research is allegedly awed by the complexities of
living systems, it is also spurred on by the idea that the know-how and devices of tech-
noscience have evolved sufficiently for life to become fully controllable and techno-
logically reproducible. Terms such as complexomics and gnotobiology seem worthwhile
to explore in detail because they provide a window into basic desires and tensions fuel-
ling current life sciences discourse. Notably, they may tell us something about how
basic concepts such as ‘life’, ‘nature’, ‘truth’ and ‘technology’ are envisioned and enframed
in evolving research practices. As discursive events, neologisms such as complexomics
may put us on the track of the guiding convictions at work in contemporary scientific
discourse. Building on Hegel, but also on Bachelard, I will refer to these basic signifiers
(‘life’, ‘nature’, ‘truth’, ‘technology’, etc.) as the philosophemes of scientific discourse (Hegel
1812/1986; Hegel 1832/1971; Bachelard 1949/1962, p. 7).
The signifier complexomics is a linguistic polymer, a collation of components, com-
pressed into a neologism, but conveying crucial convictions of contemporary life sciences
research. While –ome and –omics reflect the tendency towards molecularisation (bent on
unravelling the basic molecular building blocks or barcodes of life: nucleotides, amino
acids, proteins and so on), the prefix complex- rather refers to the complex interactions
and emerging properties of living systems. In other words, complexomics terminologically
combines a reductionist view of life (focussed on analysis, on breaking-down the phenom-
ena of life into basic molecular components) with a holistic view (life as an evolving syn-
thesis of intimately entangled molecular processes). In other words, the term sublates (in
a dialectical fashion) two (allegedly antithetical and incompatible) tendencies, namely re-
ductionism (analysis) and holism (synthesis). It merges a focus on rewriting the barcodes
of life with a focus on managing complexity, so that contemporary life sciences not only
provide a high resolution understanding of life, but also allow the scientific gaze to leap
towards a higher level complexity: beyond genetic determinism.
In other words, the signifier complexomics provides access into latent answers to
some of the basic questions addressed in life sciences laboratories of today, such as:
What is nature? What is life? What is technology? It reflects (in a highly condensed
and symptomatic manner) basic conceptual categories. The term complexomics is
symptomatic for how life sciences research is currently conducted. Hegel refers to these
basic categories (these basic answers to questions such as What is nature? What is life?
What is technology? etc.) as philosophemes. Moreover, all revolutions, in science no less
than in world history, he argues, come about when the spirit (Geist) changes its basic
categories.3 The term complexomics may be regarded as a symptom of a basic zeitgeist
shift on the level of the philosophemes, a sublation away from genetic determinism
(which focusses excessively on the explanatory power of biomolecular particles)
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towards complexity (seeing life as the end result of complex interactions between vari-
ous dimensions of living systems, referred to as –omes). According to Hegel, philoso-
phy’s vocation is to bring these basic categories to the fore, to discern and critically
assess them. In other words, a philosophical reading entails a focus on symptomatic
discursive events, reflecting basic shifts, tensions or inconsistencies on the level of the
philosophemes: a symptomatic reading of the discourses produced by science.
The core philosopheme of the natural sciences: what is nature?
Hegel’s claim that there is more philosophy in science than scientists are usually aware of,
or willing to acknowledge (1830/1970, p. 11), remains a valid starting point. The oblique
perspective proposes to bring this latent philosophical content to the surface by focussing
on the symptomatic discursive events that point to shifts and tensions on the level of the
philosophemes, the basic signifiers of scientific inquiry. During periods of transformation
and disruption, such as we are witnessing today, exemplified by the emergence of big sci-
ence and the advent of the terabyte age, the basic signifiers are under siege and in a state
of flux, amenable to change. Genetic determinism (i.e. the claim that we basically are our
genes) entails the conviction that the protein-coding genes on our genome are the pro-
gram (in Hegelian terms: the “idea”) which realises itself in the life of the organism. This
philosopheme (this basic understanding of what life essentially is), seeing genomes as pro-
grams and genes as the ultimate causal determinants of organismal phenomena, is now
challenged and complemented by post-determinist approaches which emphasise
complexity. This transition entails a shift of focus from linear causal relationships to
emergent properties of complex systems, concurrent with similar shifts in other research
areas and realms of culture. Philosophical intellectual labour consists in bringing to the
fore (“herauspräparieren”: Hegel 1832/1971, p. 75) the philosophemes of scientific dis-
course, as condensations of the spirit of the time.
The most basic philosopheme of the life sciences concerns living nature and the most
pressing philosophical objective is to determine what view of nature is at work in con-
temporary life science discourse. As a practicing philosopher, reading and listening to
scientific discourse from an oblique perspective, it often strikes me that nature is not
only studied in laboratories, but also represented as a laboratory (Zwart et al. 2015).
From the perspective of post-genomics and synthetic biology, nature as such emerges
as an outdoors laboratory of immense complexity and proportions, where a plethora of
interminable experiments are being conducted (known as evolution), while in man-
made laboratories these natural experiments are replicated, plagiarised and modified.
Rather than being a mere metaphor for nature, it entails an ontological claim: nature
really is a laboratory, from the viewpoint of contemporary science.
This idea is not completely new, of course and its genealogical origins can be traced
at least as far back as the second half of the eighteenth century, when the first labora-
tories came into being. Denis Diderot (1754/1983), for instance, already saw nature as a
laboratory or test-bed where (in the course of evolution) countless varieties of species,
limbs and organs had been systematically probed and tested.4 And laboratory animals
are likewise described by Diderot as living, organic “laboratories” whose “sensibility” is
opened-up through active modification.
In my experience this has become the dominant view, notably in emerging research
arenas such as synthetic biology. George Church, for instance, one of its key protagonists,
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argues that evolution happens both in nature and in laboratories: environments which
mirror one another (Church & Regis 2013). Likewise, according to Elowitz and Leibler
(2000), a cell is basically a “laboratory” which allows scientists to “tinker” with life and to
explore questions of biomolecular design in depth. As Meyerhoff and Lietman (2009)
argue: from a biomolecular perspective, “all the world’s a laboratory”. Microbes and vi-
ruses are constantly conducting experiments in the wild, while life sciences laboratories
aim to mimic natural laboratories as closely as possible (Benyus 1997). Purportedly, there
is no real difference between natural biotechnology (developed and used by microbes and
other organisms in the course of evolution) and artificial biotechnology (employed in
man-made laboratories around the globe). This way of seeing cells and organisms, or even
our own bodies, has become ubiquitous, even self-evident in science. Therefore, while lis-
tening (with evenly-poised attention) to lectures about proteins, mitochondria and mi-
crobes, the laboratory view of nature is what philosophers may want to grasp. Not in the
sense of counting the number of times the phrase “nature is a laboratory” is actually used,
but rather by studying the terminologies which (often in subtle and inferential ways) sug-
gest, convey and reinforce this view. Thus, the oblique perspective focuses on the tech-
nical way in which proteins, cells and molecular processes are depicted. The view of
nature as a laboratory has become the inescapable metaphysical horizon of contemporary
scientific research: its most pertinent philosopheme.
This line of thinking concurs with how Martin Heidegger studied modern science. In
Wissenschaft und Besinnung (“Science and Reflection”), for instance, he claims that con-
temporary science evidently developed an unprecedented sway over reality, acquiring a
tremendous impact on how reality presents itself to us (Heidegger 1953/1954). To a con-
siderable extent, the term ‘nature’ basically refers to nature as it is brought forward and
presented through scientific research. As a key example, Heidegger refers to elementary
particle physics, whose ‘objects’ (i.e. subatomic elementary particles) are forced to reveal
themselves via hyper-powerful machines (particle colliders), forcing them into existence
as it were, determining how and when they may become ‘visible’ to us, − insofar as
‘visibility’ still has any meaning here at all, for ultimately these particles are bound to re-
main intractable ‘objects’: spectral, transitory and evaporating phenomena, on the verge of
appearing and disappearing. We only ‘see’ them at their moment of annihilation.
This inevitably raises the question What is nature? Ultimately, Heidegger argues,
nature cannot be identified with the ‘objectivity’ produced by science. Nature (φύσις)
keeps escaping us and is bound to remain something other, something Real: nature as
that which continues to withdraw itself, which refuses to become completely identifi-
able and compatible with the techno-scientific way of making reality visible; nature as
that which flashes up, in a recalcitrant manner, in the folds and margins of the scientific
representation of the world. Furthermore, are we humans really in control? According
to Heidegger, another force seems to determine the whole process: technology as such,
expanding and proliferating, dragging research along. Something other than human
inquisitiveness seems to hold sway over this endeavour. According to Heidegger, this
hidden power will remain concealed from us if we fail to really question the fundamen-
tal terms at work in contemporary, technology-driven science, − first and foremost: the
term nature.
The view of nature as an immense outdoors in vivo laboratory discloses nature in an
outspokenly technical way. As long as we merely adopt this latent view, rather than
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questioning it, it will pervade scientific discourse up to the point of becoming self-
evident and seemingly unquestionable, so that not only science but also philosophy of
science will fall victim to its sway. Researchers will be put to work in research labora-
tories to confirm its truth. It is only by questioning the grounding dominating terms,
the philosophemes, via an oblique perspective, that we can distance ourselves from this
obfuscating termino-logical ambiance, which blinds us to other possible answers con-
cerning the question What is nature? The conception of nature is the “philosopheme of
philosophemes”, the basic metaphysical conviction guiding scientific research, affecting
experimental and discursive practices as an epistemological pandemic, pre-structuring
the way in which derivative terms and concepts are defined.
The subject-pole of the knowledge relationship
Besides neologisms referring to the object-pole (such as complexome), discursive phe-
nomena associated with the subject-pole may likewise arouse attention, such as the
current endemic focus on (or even obsession with) “misconduct” and “integrity” in re-
search. A possible explanation for the current prevalence of such labels could be to re-
gard them as symptomatic compensations in response to the decentralisation,
anonymisation and collectivisation of the scientific “subject”, of the researchers them-
selves. The focus on misconduct could reflect growing tensions between traditional re-
search ethics (focused on autonomous, responsible researchers, conducting researcher-
driven experiments, publishing results as single authors or small teams) and the
emerging trend towards large-scale research consortia, which includes automation
and multiple authorship, resulting in a marginalisation of the scientific individual
(Zwart 2008).
Habermas (1968/1973), Serres (1972) and others already argued that research is be-
coming large-scale and hyperactive. This has repercussion not only for the object-pole
of the scientific endeavour (where ‘objects’ are becoming increasingly artificial, modifi-
able and technologically reproducible with the help of high-tech research equipment),
but also for the subject-pole. Increasingly, research is transferred to machines and, ac-
cording to Habermas (1968/1973), this not only applies to the monotonous handiwork
of science, but also to brain work, to thinking as such. Humans eventually become
mere operators, highly dependent on their equipment. They themselves increasingly be-
come components within complicated networks of machines: “living accessories” in a
machine park.5
As a consequence, individual conscience and self-consciousness become increasingly
irrelevant, Habermas argues and research even immunises itself against ‘generalised’
self-consciousness, i.e. philosophical reflection. In other words, for Habermas, the trend
is toward the marginalisation and instrumentalisation of the subject, whose activities
become automated and overregulated. But as individuals will never completely coincide
with their pre-formatted roles, they will increasingly become a source of confusion and
deceit, or even potential frauds. Serres (1972) likewise argues that, in research fields
such as molecular biology, researchers are decentred by automation and laboratory
equipment, and outcompeted by computers and robotics. They may even become a
superfluous burden, a source of error or misconduct. And this is already happening.
Oblique explorations bring the broader landscape into view which gives rise to the
debate (currently in vogue, especially among research managers, university boards and
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funding agencies) on research integrity and misconduct. In other words, before provid-
ing a (technical) solution (a “therapy”, in the form of regulations, etc.), the oblique ap-
proach will first of all explore the emerging integrity challenges which researchers are
actually facing (“diagnostics”).
To overcome this growing resistance and immunisation against reflection, Habermas
(1968/1973) endorses a psychoanalytical approach, regarding psychoanalysis as the most
significant surviving representative of the critical philosophical tradition, urging us to see
emerging tensions and conflicts as symptoms of more basic ambivalences, or even path-
ologies. Moreover, rather than accepting normalisation and collectivisation, psychoanaly-
sis persistently focuses on individual dramas and biographies, summoning researchers to
work through and critically assess their experiences, for instance with regard to ‘object
choice’.6 In the next section I will explain how Lacanian psychoanalysis, notably Lacan’s
theorem of the four discourses (a crucial component of a contemporary psychoanalysis of
science), further elucidates the oblique perspective as a research strategy.
The oblique perspective and the four discourses
The key objective of the intentio obliqua is to bring to the fore (“herauspräparieren”)
and critically assess the basic philosophemes (premises, imperatives, performative signi-
fiers) of contemporary scientific discourse. Although they often remain inarticulate,
they provide pervasive guidance. Building on Lacan (1969-1970/1991), I will refer to
these basic signifiers (this conceptual-terminological base) as S1, and the discourse that
is fuelled and spurred on by them as S2. The most basic philosopheme of contemporary
life sciences discourse, as we have seen, involves the signifier “nature” and can be sum-
marised in shorthand as “nature = a laboratory”. This idea, although hardly ever articu-
lated and discussed explicitly, pre-structures emerging life sciences discourse. In terms
of Lacan’s symbolic algebra, the relationship between mainstream life sciences dis-
course (S2) and its guiding premises (S1) can be represented as: S2/S1, so that normal
scientific discourse (S2, i.e. “physics” in the general sense of the term: the experimental
study of nature, φύσις) builds on, but is at the same time literally barred from explicitly
addressing its basic metaphysical premises (S1).
In principle these basic philosophemes and imperatives may be presented in a top-
down, apodictic, authoritative, ex cathedra fashion. In that case, S1 is posited at the
top-side of the bar, resulting in what Jacques Lacan (1969-1970/1991) refers to as the
Master’s discourse, exemplified by the writings of an authoritative author (Aristoteles
dixit). The Master is regarded as infallible, his claims and premises provide guidance to
readers (students spelling his oeuvre) and the Master’s name serves as index of truth.
Any uncertainties or doubts on the part of the Master, which must have troubled him
during his life-time as a practicing philosopher (in Lacanian algebra: $, i.e. the re-
searcher as a divided subject), are disavowed and suppressed, that is: placed beneath
the bar: S1/$. The discourse of the Master addresses a scholastic readership. In contem-
porary philosophy, this role is conducted by author studies experts, the custodian of
the Master’s oeuvre (S2). Such experts are put to work, as discursive servants and ser-
vile subjects, to explain and defend the integrity and authority of the Master’s corpus
(body of writing), resulting in a particular kind of expertise or expert discourse: S2
(which refers both to the discourse as such and to the subjects who generate it). Such
university experts focus their attention on the cardinal signifiers of the Master’s oeuvre,
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which (due to their opacity and intricacy) often prove a source of frustration, but of
intellectual jouissance as well. Scholars may be drawn towards one particular ungrasp-
able, unfathomable, “impossible” concept, functioning as the intractable, inexorable
“object a” of the Master’s discourse, as Lacan phrases it. Aristotle’s concept of the
Divine Intellect which thinks itself, for instance, may stand as an example: God con-
ceived as “thinking thinking thinking” (νόησις νοήσεως νόησις, Metaphysics Λ, 1074b),
while a more mundane example would be the causa finalis (the cause that works back-
wards in time, so that something is caused by something else which is not yet realised
or brought about itself, a logical impossibility for modern science). Such “impossible”
key concepts result in a plethora of books and papers and offer windows into the
oeuvre as a whole. This combination of frustration and jouissance, circling around the
object a, and resulting in a particular type of (servile, apologetic) discourse, is regarded
as the by-product of the Master’s discourse.
With the help of four key symbols (S1, S2, $ and a), Lacan distinguishes four basic
types of discourse. The four basic symbols may be inserted as “variables” (in a fixed
sequence: $, S1, S2 and a) in four positions in a rotating, revolving, quadruped scheme:
In the case of the Master’s discourse, this results in the following scheme:
The Master (in the upper-left position of the agent) is an acknowledged, allegedly in-
fallible, authoritative voice, as we have seen. Uncertainties, disappointments and doubts
to which the Master as a real, craving individual ($) may have fallen victim in real life,
are decidedly left out of the picture, suppressed beneath the bar (S1/$). Masters address
disciples (in the upper-right position, as recipients of the message) and produce a
particular type of discourse, immersed in contemplation, metaphysics and basic geom-
etry. Plato and Aristotle may count as paradigmatic examples of Master-thinkers or
gentlemen-philosophers. They contemplate nature as a harmonious spherical whole: a
κόσμος, and hardly concern themselves with concrete interactions with real nature
(Zwart 2009). They develop a platonic view of nature.
As Lacan explains, this type of Master’s discourse (dominated by S1) contrasts with
the discourse of the servant, whose knowledge is basically know-how (“savoir-faire”,
Lacan 1969-1970/1991, p. 21). The Master (the gentleman-philosopher) is initially in
control. He appropriates the servant’s practical knowledge and transforms it into ab-
stract knowledge (ἐπιστήμη, θεωρία), for instance: Euclidean geometry. Lacan points to
the dialogue between Socrates and the slave Meno, where Socrates acts as a benevolent
gentleman-teacher, granting the illiterate slave a crash course into Euclidean geometry,
only to discover that the slave already knows his geometry, albeit in a practical, hands-
on way. Theoretical knowledge (Euclidean geometry, ἐπιστήμη) has been appropriated
by the Master, who transforms it into apodictic, deductive knowledge and now
purports to give it back, as a gift, in the form of education (Lacan 1969-1970/
1991, p. 22).
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But in the end, the practical knowledge of the servants will prove much more power-
ful and effective compared to the lofty contemplations of the Masters who, instead of
really interacting with and transforming nature, rather develop a worldview, i.e. an im-
aginary vision of nature (as a spherical, harmonious whole, a κόσμος). Eventually, the
supremacy of the Master (S1) will by subverted by the practical know-how of the ser-
vant (S2), so that in the end S2 will come to occupy (usurp) the upper-left position as
agent. The power of the Master is subverted (S2/S1), the Master’s voice suppressed and
the scheme takes a quarter turn to the left.
Hegel’s dialectics of Master and Servant, developed in his Phenomenology of the
Spirit (Hegel 1807/1973) may elucidate this inevitable dialectical turn. Initially, the
Servant acknowledges the supremacy of the Master. Instead of challenging the latter’s
authority, the Servant willingly relinquishes his own autonomy, opting for an attitude
of devotion and servitude. Such servants are put to work, in the interest of the Master.
Rather than aspiring to become Masters themselves, which would lead to competition
and warfare, they accept a subordinate position of dependency. This type of servitude
produces a particular form of jouissance, for the servant guards the Master’s truth.
Inevitably, however, a dialectal dynamics unfolds, which eventually subverts the situ-
ation in the sense that the discourse of the Master becomes increasingly dependent on
the work of the servants. They become increasingly skilful, first of all as custodians and
interpreters of the Master’s founding gestures.
But the emancipation of the servants does not stop there. Rather, instead of relying on
the signifiers coined by the Master to understand nature, the servants will explore and
interact with nature more directly. Increasingly, the Master’s apodictic views are sup-
pressed (pushed beneath the bar), as servants rely on hands-on, practical interactions with
nature, developing powerful tools to manipulate and manage natural objects more effect-
ively: the birth of the experimental method. Exegesis increasingly gives way to experimen-
tal work (manipulating and quantifying nature). Via skills and know-how, the servants
assume mastery over the situation. They become scientists, scientific agents (S2 in the
upper-left position), while the meta-physical pontifications of the Master becomes a su-
perfluous burden, so that the power relationship becomes subverted, and a new type of
discourse emerges, to which Lacan refers as the university discourse:
Now the Master no longer addresses the Servant explicitly. The Master’s imperatives
are disavowed, repressed and pushed beneath the bar. The former servants have eman-
cipated themselves: they have become scientific experts, addressing nature on their
own accord. They focus their attention on a particular object, however, a particular
problem or process, a particular molecule or model organism: a particular object of
choice (a). Rather than studying living nature as a whole, a κόσμος, nature becomes
condensed and compressed into a particularly intriguing but highly demanding entity
(a). Although initially the scientists (S2) seem in control of the situation, eventually the
unfathomable object may prove a demanding, addictive, toxic lure. Instead of the ex-
pert being in control (manipulating the object) it is the other way around: the object
becomes the active force, drawing the researcher towards it.
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Take for example John Sulston’s research on the (hermaphrodite) nematode worm C-
Elegans. In his auto-biography he explains how he “first met the worm” (Sulston &
Ferry 2003, p. 17) in 1969 in the Laboratory of Molecular Biology in Cambridge (UK):
a tiny, self-fertilising species, a millimetre long, while Sulston was given a metre of
bench space to work on it, a labour which he later continued in San Diego. As a scien-
tific monk he spent many years tracing, with the help of a special microscope, the de-
velopment of all the 959 cells of the nematode’s body, and would eventually be
awarded the Nobel Prize for this. But for many other researchers, the object of choice
will rather prove a source of frustration, resulting in various symptoms, from workahol-
ism via burn-out up to fraud ($). Rather than experiencing gratification and success,
scientific subjects will often find themselves hopelessly chained to and drained by their
inexorable object a.
This dialectical schema may also help to understand the changing relationships
between philosophy and science. Philosophy no longer occupies the position of the
Master, as it did during previous epochs, when metaphysics was still in vogue (S1 as
agent). The former servants acquired agency via experimental, hands-on, technology-
based research (‘laboratory’ literally means workshop), actively interacting with their re-
search objects. Scientists develop increasingly effective lab tools to generate robust
knowledge and refurbish nature. The contemplating gentleman is dethroned, and
metaphysics no longer provides apodictic guidance. Metaphysics is marginalised, be-
comes a research field in statu moriendi, and yet it is still there, occupying the position
of the (suppressed, latent, disavowed) truth of scientific discourse (S1 below the bar).
In the Introduction to his Philosophy of Nature, Hegel (1830/1970) deplores that
metaphysics, the Master’s discourse par excellence, has fallen into disrepute.
Metaphysics has been replaced and subverted by insights produced by natural science.
A field of knowledge which once aspired supremacy over other (more practical and
reality-oriented) fields has now fallen silent.7 But rather than becoming obsolete, phil-
osophy finds itself in a new position (1818/1970, p. 402). The era of metaphysics did
not end with the rise of laboratory science, Hegel argues, but the focus of attention
must now shift to the implicit metaphysics at work in scientific discourse (S1, the basic
premises, pushed beneath the bar, as the terminological unconscious of science). By
taking up this challenge, a new dawn (‘Morgenröte’) may set in. Philosophers may ques-
tion and critically assess the latent but guiding philosophemes (S1) of science. Rather
than being delisted from the agenda, the metaphysical question “What is nature?”
proves inescapable. We are both drawn to and repelled by this question: difficult to an-
swer, but impossible not to ask (Hegel 1830/1970). We simply cannot ignore this basic
philosopheme of science.8 Scientific research (S2) it not a purely technical or empirical
endeavor, but entails a profound, yet tacit understanding of nature (S1), an inspiring
truth, which can and should be brought to the fore and critically examined by philoso-
phy. Science is adrift, moreover. We are in the middle of a scientific revolution, so that
the philosophemes of science are becoming fundamentally questionable, are being dras-
tically redefined (S1→ S1).
Experimental researchers (S2) as agents (upper-left position) focus their attention on
various kinds of objects as targets of their cupido sciendi, their will to know. Laboratory
objects (a particular type of microbe, virus or protein or a particular model organism)
function as the intractable entity (object a in the upper-right position) which drains
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their intellectual energy, time and resources, but continues to escape them, for instance
because initial results cannot be replicated. In normal science, the laboratory expert
(S2) as agent seems firmly in control, but in real laboratory life, scientists may fall vic-
tim to the situation, become trapped by the inexorable object a, on which a whole life-
time may be wasted. Due to frustrations awaiting them, scientists become tormented
subjects ($ in the lower-right position), with discontent and doubt as by-products of ex-
perimental research.
The oblique perspective as the discourse of the analyst
What mode of discourse will philosophy generate, looking at and listening to science
from an oblique perspective? Rather than apodictic deductions (as in the Master’s dis-
course), the oblique perspective involves hard labour, with philosophers working their
way through the archives, the multiple and interminable discourses of science. Philoso-
phy becomes research, but in its own (oblique) way. The focus is neither on the oeuvre
of the Master (as in author studies), nor on developing a specific type of expertise (such
as health law or bioethics, which concur, in terms of discursive structure, with univer-
sity discourse), but rather on the ways in which life science research is enacted and life
sciences discourse is framed.
Some instances of philosophical inquiry may reflect what Lacan refers to as university
discourse, namely when philosophers aspire to develop specialized expert knowledge,
as ethical experts for instance, applying basic sets of principles or argumentative
skills to cases. Such experts serve as ethical engineers. Mainstream applied bioethics
reflects the university mode of discourse when ethical expertise basically consists in
a particular kind of literacy and fluency concerning a particular ethical grammar, de-
veloped for analysing and addressing moral dilemmas in preformatted ways. Other
philosophers may become the custodians of an oeuvre, of the intellectual legacy of a
deceased author, which threatens to become a dead letter (discursive “litter” as it
were) and therefore has to be reinterpreted, reanimated. In this discursive mode, the
experts (S2) relinquish the ideal of becoming genuine philosophers themselves
(addressing issues emerging in science and society in an active manner, moving be-
yond established discourse, perhaps experiencing the euphoria of a truth event), but
rather settle for the more moderate joys of the disciple, guarding the Master’s trea-
sures against vulgarisation.
Philosophers may also opt for what Lacan refers to as the hysteric’s discourse. In this
case, the tormented, divided subject (in Lacanian algebra: $) emphatically takes the
floor as agent, raising a voice of societal protest. This type of discourse figures promin-
ently in societal debates on science and technology, where philosophers may become
activists, challenging the voice of authority, the authoritative Other as the recipient of
the message (S1 in the upper-right position):
In his book Critique of Cynical Reason, Peter Sloterdijk (1983) endorses this type of
discourse as a genuine philosophical position, by tracing its genealogy, which takes us
back to the ancient Cynics: a boisterous tradition relying on provocative gestures and
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dramatic, ludicrous or scandalous interventions, a bold, impertinent, popular, gay, prac-
tical, provocative, theatrical and grotesque style of moral critique (Zwart 2016).
An oblique perspective, however, confronted with the (often boisterous and passion-
ate) interactions between $ and S1, will spur these activists towards self-reflection.
What is really driving their protest (often directed at very specific targets), what kind of
uneasiness or desire is at work beneath the bar, pointing beyond the issue at hand per-
haps, towards a more basic discontent in science, or in civilisation even? What do these
activists really want? By asking such questions, philosophers have already entered a dif-
ferent type of discourse, namely the discourse of the analyst.
Although philosophers may play various roles and may function as Master (the
philosopher as guru: S1 as agent), as experts (in author studies or applied ethics: S2 as
agent), or as activist ($ as agent), a fourth type of discourse is more recommendable
and concurrent with the oblique perspective, namely the discourse of the analyst, a
paradoxical term, since (ideally) the analyst is the one who does not speak, but rather
listens, with evenly-poised attention. For this type of discourse to work, the philoso-
pher’s expertise and knowledge (S2) must be suspended, placed beneath the bar (lower-
right position), at least temporarily: a position known as learned ignorance (docta
ignorantia). But precisely because of this intellectual self-constraint, this willingness to
bracket established philosophical views concerning life, science, nature and technology
(ἐποχή), the floor is open to other voices, to experiences of practicing researchers,
driven by a scientific will to know (their cupido sciendi). Thus, the ultimate target of
desire, referred to by Lacan as the inexorable object a, comes into view, occupying the
position of agent: triggering, commanding and frustrating the scientists’ interminable
work. This object challenges the scientists’ prowess and arouses their desire, but con-
tinues to escape them, so that they emerge as tormented subjects ($ in the upper-right
position).
This type of discourse builds on the tradition inaugurated by Socrates, and the ob-
lique approach is quite compatible with his ethos, bent on transforming seemingly
every-day settings (lectures, discussions, readings, meetings, site-visits, etc.) into philo-
sophical laboratories, where the philosophemes of contemporary discourse can be artic-
ulated and examined:
Psychoanalysis is not a science, but a discursive practice prompting self-reflection.
What is it that researchers find so fascinating about their object a? Why do they waste
the most fruitful years of their life on this alluring entity, why do they consider it the
panacea or missing link? Oblique philosophy basically entails embedded dialogue, how-
ever and philosophical interpretations and assessments are only valid and effective in-
sofar as they provoke further deliberations and reflections on the part of the scientific
subjects themselves (i.e. mutual learning).
A risk involved in this type of discourse is that, in the end, the analyst is mistaken for
a Master, the author of an opaque, authoritative and apodictic discourse, giving rise to
discursive servitude (S1 in the lower-right position), as happened with authors such as
Freud and Lacan, so that their followers fall into the trap of posing as servile, apologetic
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“experts” of an oeuvre, rather than as active philosophers themselves, oriented towards
assessing and questioning the emerging discourses of technoscience from an oblique
perspective. But in the current era, where philosophical reflection has become a collect-
ive and distributed endeavour, such a scenario has become less likely.
This does not imply that philosophers should engage in the discourse of the analyst
continuously. In the unfolding process they may switch to other types of discourse, opt
for other discursive modes, temporarily acting as author studies expert, for instance or
ethics expert, or social activist, but the discourse of the analyst, concurring with the ob-
lique perspective, allows us to discern the strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and
traps of these discursive options. As Hegel phrased it, rather than being the first to
speak (as agent), philosophers spread their wings at dusk, as owls of Minerva, when
other types of discourse have already thrived, when other agents (S1, S2, $) have already
spoken. The philosopher’s intellectual labour consists in reading and listening with
evenly-poised attention to how others have already responded to the situation. Rather
than opting for expertise, activism or pontification, oblique philosophers point to dis-
cursive symptoms, ambiguities, blind spots and contradictions that reflect the philoso-
phemes adrift. The starting point is that we no longer know what nature, life, truth,
technology, etc. really is. Such issues emerge in the context of a critical dialogue, a liv-
ing oblique laboratory, a mutual learning exercise.
Thus, an oblique (symptomatic) reading of contemporary life sciences (as an inter-
minable flow of university discourse) will focus on the symptoms that allow philosoph-
ical intentionality to shift from scientific discourse as such (S2) to the philosophemes
that actually guide and structure it (S1), but also to the tormented subjects ($) who as-
pire to adhere to normalised discourse and its imperatives, but experience challenging
obstacles and inhibitions in their interactions with their object of desire (a). Such re-
searchers may even be tempted to commit “misconduct” in order to maintain a
semblance of normality and performativity. In order to detect and disclose the philoso-
phemes (S1), specific signifiers are singled out as especially relevant. Building on the
etymology of λόγος (Heidegger 1951/1954), an oblique reading (lectio) tends to be se-
lective, so that lectio becomes selectio and attention becomes fixed on specific, revela-
tory terms, reflecting in a symptomatic manner the shifting philosophemes. But it is via
the discourse of the (apparently normalised, but actually challenged and tormented)
scientific subjects that these philosophemes are disclosed (S2→ $→ S1).
Discourse-, subject- or object-centred?
Via established scientific discourse (S2, the flow of scientific signifiers) and the speech
acts of challenged, tormented scientists ($), the oblique perspective exposes the philo-
sophemes of science (S1), i.e. the imperatives that guide researchers towards the object
of their cupido sciendi (a). In Lacanian algebra normal scientific discourse can be repre-
sented as (S2 ◊ a), where S2 refers to the discourse of university experts (as agents)
while a represents the target of their will to know, and the lozenge or poinçon (◊)
stands for laboratory contrivances, for instance optic devices such microscopes, enab-
ling experimenters to zoom out (<) or in (>), bringing the object into view while keep-
ing their distance. This suggests that the scientific agent is firmly in control, but in
reality researchers may fall victim to the situation and revert to the position of the tor-
mented, desiring subject (S2→ $) while the allegedly normalised object may prove an
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ungraspable, inexorable, disturbing factor, putting the subject out of balance, so that
the standard formula (S2 ◊ a) actually is a cover-up, a façade for what really should be
represented as ($ ◊ a), − a Lacanian equation known as the matheme of desire.
The basic tendency in scientific research is towards anonymisation and normalisation
of the scientific subject. Researchers are expected to relinquish their “subjective” fasci-
nations, interests and desires and to become mainstreamed contributors ($→ S2), a
tendency which is reinforced by automation and high-tech research contrivances
(represented by the lozenge), but also by the use of technical terms, standardised for-
mats and formulaic phrases in academic writing (S2). Research has become large-scale
teamwork conducted by consortia employing big machines and resulting in multiple
author output, where hundreds of researchers may be listed as author, in alphabetic
order. Thus, the technification and standardisation of the object is paralleled by tech-
nical forms of authorship (Foucault 1969/1994), where author names are basically used
to facilitate retrieval (as search terms) or quality assessment (of research groups) or as
shorthand for theorems, syndromes or instruments (eponymy). Authorship attribution
is increasingly becoming a device for facilitating the production, storage, circulation
and retrieval of texts (preferably in electronic formats) or for detecting and penalising
misconduct.
That the basic attitude of scientific research is discourse-centred rather than subject-
centred was already emphasised by Nietzsche in Dawn of Day (1881/1980, § 547). Until
recently, he argues, the scientist was a genius, a privileged individual expected to solve
big riddles in a single, brilliant stroke. In contemporary science, however, such forms of
ego-centricity have clearly become untenable. Research is teamwork, employing an-
onymous (often early stage) researchers who are closely supervised, while most of the
actual work is effectively carried out by machines, and Nietzsche foresaw this when he
claimed that in the future, the role of the scientific individual would become increas-
ingly marginalised: “What do I matter?” should be written over the scientist’s door.9 In
his essay on the death of the author (already cited), Foucault (1969/1994) endorses this
view. What does it matter who is speaking? In this indifference towards individuality,
Foucault argues, resides the fundamental ethos of contemporary scientific discourse.10
The core conviction that research findings should be replicable already implies that
researchers should be replaceable. Scientific discourse is framed as an anonymous and
interminable practice.
To some extent, this ethos has been there from the very beginning. Heraclitus already
urged his audience not to pay attention to him (as a person) but rather, via him, to rea-
son as such.11 Ideally, λόγος (reason, language, discourse) speaks. In contemporary sci-
entific discourse this imperative seems very much alive. While browsing through the
scientific literature, we read discourse rather than authors. In science, ‘it’ speaks, result-
ing in a continuous, interminable, proliferating flow of anonymous words without au-
thors (S2). To single out one particular author (or even a small number of authors), in
the context of Nobel Prize award procedures for instance, seems increasingly unfeasible
and unfair (Zwart 2010).
Thus, the subject-pole of the knowledge dynamics is exposed to similar processes of
purification and standardisation as the object-pole. The subject is effectively decentred,
depersonalised and emptied of its ideological, subjective content, through training and
socialisation, but also via automation and laboratory equipment. The subject is cleansed
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of its sociocultural heritage of ideas and associations concerning ‘nature’, ‘life’,
‘embodiment’ etc. (Bachelard 1938/1947), of its traditional Bildung, so that ideally a re-
liable, depersonalised and highly functional subject remains, dwelling in laboratories,
smoothly interacting with (and increasingly replaceable by) machines: a subject without
psychic depth: a kenotic subject (Zwart 2016).12
Yet, this can never be fully achieved, due to the recalcitrance of the research targets
involved. Individuals will eventually prove unable to completely live up to the methodo-
logical imperatives proclaimed by the demanding superego of Big Science (S1). They
are tormented by desire, mistrusted as potential frauds and hyper-actively obsessed
with their research object of choice ($ ◊ a), filtering out anything else as noise. They
become introverts, stubbornly refusing to displace their intentionality to something
else, or to be replaced themselves (as this would imply separation from their laboratory
object). This may raise intriguing questions, such as: why has this particular object (this
particular molecule, microbe or model organism) become such an object of desire, such
a fetish: the sole and life-long target of the scientist’s cupido sciendi? By addressing such
questions, however, we have already opted for an oblique style of reading, a change of
perspective and the focus of attention reverts from ‘context of justification’ to ‘context
of discovery’, analysing concrete subjects who, in concrete research settings, face de-
manding objects (a). Thus, the oblique perspective develops an interest in science biog-
raphies or autobiographies, “case histories” which report in detail how researchers not
only manipulate and purify their object, but also are addressed and edified (as well as
tormented and frustrated) by these demanding entities.
An intriguing example is DNA-researcher Maurice Wilkins (2003/2005) who, in his
memoirs, describes his obsessive efforts to produce pure, undiluted strands of DNA,
until at a certain point his DNA is so “excellent” that it is shouting at him, “Look how
regular I am!” (p. 124). The experience of DNA as something which speaks out to a re-
searcher is also conveyed by Watson in the movie Life Story (Jackson 1987), based on
autobiographical reports, where he exclaims, after Wilkins has handed him Rosalind
Franklin’s infamous photograph 51: “I could not believe my eyes; it was just sitting
there, yelling out information, like a speak your weight machine” (Zwart 2015). In other
words, the replaceable expert of normal science (S2) is actually a desiring subject ($),
confronted with a demanding object ($ ◊ a). The oblique perspective concurs with the
discourse of the analyst, focussing on the object a (in the upper-left position of agent)
as something which actively addresses and enforces itself upon the subject (in the
upper-left position as recipient).
While continental philosophers often act as custodians of a Master’s discourse (as
experts of an oeuvre), the oblique perspective entails a different role, analysing the
dialectical interaction between tormented researchers ($) and their objects of desire
(a). And instead of opting for a top-down, metaphysical approach, philosophers
read and reread the scientific files, the avalanche of papers produced by laborator-
ies worldwide, with evenly-poised attention, from a tilted, oblique perspective,
using revelatory signifiers (complexomics, gnotobiology, etc.) as discursive symp-
toms, probing them with the help of a diagnostic reflex hammer, a plessor, a
stethoscope, a magnifying-glass.
It is via discourse that the scientific object comes into focus. In post-phenomenology
(Verbeek 2000/2005) and object-oriented ontology (Harman 2011) the question has
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been raised whether philosophy, by focussing on speaking subjects (on discourse), ne-
glects and obscures the things, the objects. Is the oblique perspective a retreat into
purely linguistic terrain? As Coeckelbergh (2015) emphasises, phrases such as
“language or technology” or “subject or object” are misleading. It is via the discourse
of the tormented scientific researcher that the intractable “object a” comes into view
($ ◊ a). In normal science, researchers prefer to work with normalised, standardised
objects of research (molecules, microbes, model organisms, etc.). Although they once
were challenging targets, they are now domesticated and transformed into a research
tool, a fully controllable laboratory device. Research targets such as gnotobiotic
model organisms become reproducible units within techno-scientific arrangements.
Model organisms (from C. elegans down to bacteriophages) are products of labora-
tory settings. And “-omics” entities (genomes, metabolomes, transcriptomes, etc.) are
likewise intimately connected with technology. They are hyper-technical “objects”
and can only exist in a highly specialised technological ambiance. Yet, in the folds
and margins of normalised and established research practices, unexpected findings
may point to the presence of disruptive factors: the intrusion of a treacherous object
a, a factor X, inciting suspicion and evoking desire. The oblique perspective implies
that the object-pole comes into view via the discourse of the scientific expert. It is
not our decision to study genomes, amino acids or synthetic cells. Rather, the
intentionality of the oblique perspective is determined by the scientific research
practices under study. Their objects (genes, proteins, genomes, etc.) become our ob-
jects as well, approaching them from an obliquely perspective.
Endnotes
1Das was ist zu begreifen, ist die Aufgabe der Philosophie … [Sie ist] ihre Zeit in
Gedanken erfasst (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel 1821/1970, p. 26)
2The term was already introduced in the 1960s (Luckey 1963) and its genealogy
stretches as far back as the work of Pasteur and Metchnikoff.
3“Alle Revolutionen, in den Wissenschaften nicht weniger als in der Weltgeschichte,
kommen nur daher, dass der Geist … seine Kategorien geändert hat” (Hegel 1830/
1970, 9, § 246, Zusatz, p. 21).
4Letter to Duclos, October 10, 1765.
5This even applies to the (digital) humanities, by the way, where close reading gives
way to “distant reading” (Herrnstein Smith 2016).
6While endorsing psychoanalysis, Habermas (1968/1973) vehemently rejects the
positions of Nietzsche: the self-annihilation and abnegation of reflection as something
superfluous, self-deceptive and meaningless.
7“Diese Morgenröte begrüße ich, rufe ich an, mit ihm nur habe ich es zu tun”
(Hegel 1818/1970, 10, p. 403).
8Was ist die Natur? Wir finden die Natur als ein Rätsel und Problem vor uns, das
wir ebenso aufzulösen uns getrieben fühlen, als wir davon abgestoßen werden… Wir
sammeln Kenntnisse über die mannigfaltigen Gestaltungen und Gesetze der Natur; dies
geht in ein unendliches Detail hinaus, hinauf, hinunter, hinein; und eben weil kein Ende
darin abzusehen ist, so befriedigt uns dieses Verfahren nicht. Und in allem diesem
Reichtum der Erkenntnis kann uns die Frage von neuem kommen oder erst entstehen:
was ist die Natur? Sie bleibt ein Problem (Hegel 1830/1970, p. 12).
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9“Daraus ergibt sich, daß im Großen und Ganzen die Wissenschaft … mit einer
höheren und großmütigeren Grundempfindung fürderhin getrieben werden muß. ‘Was
liegt an mir!’ – steht über der Tür des künftigen Denkers” (Nietzsche 1881/1980, § 547).
10Qu’importe qui parle? En cette indifférence s’affirme le principe éthique, de plus
fundamental peut-être, de l’écriture contemporaine (Foucault 1994, 789); Cf. Hegel:
“Weil … der Anteil, der an dem gesamten Werke des Geistes auf die Tätigkeit des
Individuums fällt, nur gering sein kann, so muss dieses, wie die Natur der Wissenschaft
schon es mit sich bringt, sich umso mehr vergessen (Hegel 1807/1973, p. 66)”.
11Fragment 50: “οὐκ ἐμοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας…” (‘By listening, not to me,
but to reason…’). See for Instance Heidegger (1951/1954, p. 207).
12The term κένωσις refers to a gesture of self-emptying or self-renunciation in
order to achieve an ethos of servitude. Cf. Paul’s Letter to the Philippians (2:7).
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